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Abstract
We use a French firm-level data set containing 13,000 firms over the period 1993-2004 to analyze
the relationship between credit constraints and firms’ R&D behavior over the business cycle. Our
main results can be summarized as follows: (i) the share of R&D investment over total investment
is countercyclical without credit constraints, but it becomes less countercyclical as firms face tighter
credit constraints; (ii) this result is magnified for firms in sectors that depend more heavily upon
external finance, or that are characterized by a low degree of asset tangibility ; (iii) in more credit
constrained firms, R&D investment share plummets during recessions but does not increase propor-
tionally during upturns; (iv) average R&D investment and productivity growth are more negatively
correlated with sales volatility in more credit constrained firms.
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I Introduction
A Schumpeterian view of business cycles and growth is that recessions provide a cleansing mechanism
for correcting organizational inefficiencies and for encouraging firms to reorganize, innovate or reallo-
cate to new markets. The cleansing effect of recessions is also to eliminate those firms that are unable
to reorganize or innovate. Schumpeter1 himself would summarize that view as follows; “[Recessions]
are but temporary. They are means to reconstruct each time the economic system on a more effi-
cient plan”. This of course assumes that firms can always borrow enough funds to either reorganize
their activities or move to new activities and markets. Investment choices are indeed dictated by an
opportunity-cost effect: namely, the opportunity cost of long-term innovative investments instead of
short-term capital investments, is lower in recessions than in booms. Hence, the share of long-term
investment in total investment should be countercyclical, whereas the share of short-term investment
is procyclical (see Hall (1993), Gali and Hammour (1992), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), Bean (1990),
Bloom (2007)).
However, this is only true to the extent that firms are not credit constrained. As emphasized by
Aghion et al. (2005), henceforth AABM, things become quite different when credit market imperfec-
tions prevent firms from innovating and reorganizing in recessions. In particular, suppose that firms
can choose between short-run capital investment and long-term R&D investment, that innovating re-
quires that firms survive short-run liquidity shocks, and that to cover liquidity costs firms can rely
only on their short-run earnings plus borrowing. Whenever the firm is hit by a bad (idiosyncratic
or aggregate) shock, its current earnings are reduced, and therefore so is the firms’ ability to borrow
in order to innovate. This in turn implies that a negative shock should hit R&D investments and
innovation more in firms that are more credit constrained. In other words, R&D investments should
be expected to be less countercyclical in firms facing tighter credit constraints.
In this paper, we test this prediction using a French firm-level panel data set that contains infor-
mation both, on the extent of credit constraints at the firm level each year, and on R&D investments
by the firm, relative to total investment. The firm-level database we use has been collected by the
Banque de France. The sample includes about 13,000 firms (all of them having at least one time
a positive R&D investment) and covers the period 1993-2004. The database contains an important
number of small and medium firms that are particularly prone to be hit by credit constraints, and are
thus especially relevant for the study of the above-mentioned mechanisms.
We regress firm R&D over total investment on firm sales and its interaction with credit constraints.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) the share of R&D investment over total investment
1See Schumpeter (1942).
is countercyclical without credit constraints, and it becomes less countercyclical as firms face tighter
credit constrained; (iii) this effect is only observed during downturns: namely, in presence of credit
constraints, R&D investment share plummets during recessions but it does not increase proportionally
during upturns; (iv) the level of R&D investment is lower in more credit constrained firms whatever
the firm’s position within the business cycle - but it decreases more during recessions.
These results has important implications at the macroeconomic level. First, because by preventing
firms from investing in R&D during downturns, credit constraints decrease average R&D investment
and productivity growth. Second, because without credit constraints, the countercyclicality of R&D
investment has a smoothing effect on aggregate volatility. By preventing R&D investment from being
countercyclical, credit constraints may also prevent R&D from having this smoothing effect, thus
amplifying volatility. The existence of credit constraints may thus increase both volatility and its
negative effect on average productivity growth. The last part of this paper provides empirical evidence
supporting these effects.
This paper relates to a broader literature on cycles, innovation and growth. The theoretical papers
that are most closely related to our approach in this paper are Hall (1991), Gali and Hammour (1992),
Caballero and Hammour (1994), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), Comin
and Gertler (2006), and Barlevy (2004, 2007). All these papers take a Schumpeterian approach to
the relationship between growth and cycles, however they do not emphasize credit constraints. The
empirical literature on the subject starts with Ramey and Ramey (1995) who provide cross-country
evidence of a negative relationship between volatility and growth. More closely related to the analysis
in this paper is AABM. Based on cross-country panel data over the period 1960-2000, AABM show
that structural investment (another proxy for growth-enhancing investment) is less countercyclical
in countries with lower ratios of credit to GDP, and that the correlation between macroeconomic
volatility (measured as in Ramey and Ramey (1995) by the variance of growth rate) and average
growth, is more negative the lower financial development. However, unlike in this paper, the data in
AABM do not include R&D investments, and moreover credit constraints are not measured at the
firm level. Prior evidence on R&D investments over the cycle is provided by Griliches (1990), Comin
and Gertler (2006), and Barlevy (2007), although not in relation to firms’ credit constraints2.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model to derive our main predictions.
Section 3 presents the data and the measurement variables, and in particular our measure of credit
constraint. Section 4 presents the key results. Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results and
their implications for productivity growth and volatility, and it concludes.
2Barlevy (2007) finds no evidence of current cash flows affecting how firms’ current R&D investments respond to the
business cycle. However, in Barlevy’s own estimations, lagged cash flows turn out to significantly affect how current
R&D investment reacts to the firm’s current position in the business cycle.
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II Model
1 Basic environment
There is a continuum of two period lived risk-neutral entrepreneurs who maximize their wealth. An
entrepreneur faces a sales shock at at time t and at+1 at time t + 1, where
at ∈ {a, a},
and
p = Pr(at+1 = a/at = a)
= Pr(at+1 = a/at = a)
is strictly less than one but greater than 1/2 so that there is some persistence to a sales shock over
time.
At the beginning of her first period, an entrepreneur born at date t decides about: (i) short-run
capital investment kt, which yields short run profit atkt at cost
1
2dk
2
t at the end of the first period,
and; (ii) long-term R&D investment zt , which yields an innovation value vt+1 equal to the expected
productivity E(at+1/at) in period (t+1) with probability zt in the second period, at cost
1
2cz
2
t . Credit
market imperfections may prevent a firm with short-run profit flow atkt from investing more than
µatkt in R&D, where µ ≥ 1 measures the extent to which the firm can borrow using its first period
return as collateral.
2 Profit maximization and optimal investments
Consider first the benchmark case where the entrepreneur is not credit constrained. Then she will
choose k and z to
max
k,z
{atk + E(at+1/at)z −
1
2
dk2 −
1
2
cz2},
which yields
dk = at; (1)
cz = E(at+1/at) = pat + (1− p)a−t, (2)
where
a−t 6= at
3
In particular, given that p < 1, the ratio
z
k
=
d
c
E(at+1/at)
at
=
d
c
[p + (1− p)
a−t
at
] (3)
is countercyclical, that is, lower when sales are high with at = a than when sales are low with at = a.
This is the opportunity cost effect already mentioned in the introduction.
Now, consider the case where the entrepreneur is credit-constrained. Then she will choose k and
z to
max
k,z
{atk + E(at+1/at)z −
1
2
dk2 −
1
2
cz2}
s.t. z ≤ µkat .
The credit-constraint is binding whenever the equilibrium R&D level in the absence of credit
constraint, is higher than µkat in equilibrium, that is, whenever
E(at+1/at)
c
> µ
(at)
2
d
.
This latter condition, which can be reexpressed as
1
c
[p + (1− p)
a−t
at
] > µ
at
d
, (4)
is more likely to be satisfied when the firms faces a low sales shock (with at = a and a−t = a) than
when it faces a high sales shock (with at = a and a−t = a).
Suppose first that the credit constraint binds only when sales are low. Then the ratio of R&D over
capital investment z
k
is necessarily procyclical. To see this, note that: (i) when at = a, this ratio is
unconstrained and thus from (3) it is equal to:
(
z
k
)higha =
d
c
[p + (1− p)
a
a
];
(ii) when at = a the credit constraint is binding so that the R&D/capital ratio is equal to:
(
z
k
)lowa = µa;
(iii) our assumption that (4) is satisfied for at = a, which immediately implies that:
(
z
k
)lowa < (
z
k
)higha.
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Another predictions in this case is that a lower µ reduces ( z
k
)lowa without affecting ( z
k
)higha. Thus,
lowering µ will result in a lower equilibrium R&D investment reduced in a low sales shock, whereas
the R&D investment is unchanged in a high sales shock.
Overall, the R&D/capital ratio will be less countercyclical in a firm facing tighter credit constraints,
and that firm will also invest relatively less in R&D on average over time. These predictions will be
validated by our empirical analysis in the next sections.
Now, suppose that condition (4) is always binding. Then the equilibrium R&D/capital ratio
remains procyclical, with
(
z
k
)lowa = µa < (
z
k
)higha = µa.
However, in this case, a lower µ will reduce the R&D/capital ratio z
k
more when the firm faces high
sales (when at = a) than when it faces low sales (at = a) since
d
dµ
[(
z
k
)higha − (
z
k
)lowa] = a− a > 0.
This case is not the most plausible, as we can expect firms to be less credit-constrained in high
than in low-sales states. And indeed our empirical analysis will not support this latter prediction that
tightening credit constraints should reduce the R&D share of investment by more in upturns than in
downturns.
To complete our analysis of the model, we can derive the equilibrium R&D investment under high
and low current sales respectively. If the credit constraint does not bind, then from (2) we have:
z =
E(at+1/at)
c
.
And if it binds one can show that3:
3To see this, note that when the credit constraint binds, we have
z = µkat
so that the optimal capital investment k solves:
max
k
{atk + E(at+1/at)µkat −
1
2
dk2 −
1
2
c(µkat)
2}.
From first order condition we get:
k =
1
d + c(µat)2
at[1 + µE(at+1/at)]
and therefore
z = µkat
=
µ
d + c(µat)2
(at)
2[1 + µE(at+1/at)].
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z =
1
d + c(µat)2
µ(at)
2[1 + µE(at+1/at)].
It then follows that R&D is procyclical when the credit constraint binds in the low sales state.
This is obvious when the firm is also constrained in the high sales state, as
a2
d + c(µa)2
>
a2
d + c(µa)2
and
[1 + µ(pa + (1− p)a)] < [1 + µ(pa + (1− p)a)]
when p > 1/2. It is a fortiori true when the firm is constrained in the low sales state only since the
credit constraint affects the R&D investment primarily.
3 Main theoretical predictions
The main predictions that emerge from our analysis in this section can be summarized as follows:
1. The more credit constrained the firm is, the less countercyclical its (relative) R&D investment
(in the sense that it reacts more positively to the firm’s current sales).
2. Tighter credit constraints interact with sales in an asymmetric fashion over the business cycle.
In particular, starting from a situation where credit constraints are more binding in downturns,
a tightening of credit-constraints or an increase in the volatility of sales, reduce the firm’s R&D
investment more in a downturn than it might increase it in an upturn. It thus reduces the firm’s
average R&D investment.
In the remaining part of the paper we take these predictions to French firm-level panel data.
III Data
Our empirical analysis merges two different French-firm-level datasets: FiBen and the payment incident
dataset, which we now describe in more details.
1 The FiBEn database
Our core data comes from FiBEn, a large French-firm-level database constructed by the Banque de
France. FiBEn is based on fiscal documents, including balance sheet and P&L statement, and thus
contains detailed information on both flow and stock accounting variables. A subsample of FiBEn,
6
called Centrale des Bilans, is available for a lower number of firms and includes additional information
directly collected by the Banque de France. This additional data allow us to perform additional
consistency and accuracy tests.
The FiBen database includes all French firms with sales at least equal to 75,000 euros or with credit
outstanding of at least 38,000 euros; annual accounting data are then available for about 200,000 firms.
In 2004, FiBEn covered 80% of the firms with 20 to 500 employees, and 98% of those employing more
than 500 employees4.
We then restrict our sample by looking only at firms that have at least one year a positive R&D
investment; our sample is unbalanced and includes about 13,000 firms over the period 1993-2004. A
same firm appears in our database during a seven year period on average.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for our key variables, including the R&D share of
investment, and the measure of credit constraint we use in the empirical analysis; this measure, which
is referred to as ”payment incident”, will be described and analyzed in details in two of the following
subsections.
Our final sample includes an important number of small and medium firms5, that are particularly
prone to be hit by credit constraints.
2 R&D variable
Among the variables for which FiBEn data are available, we choose to concentrate on R&D investment
rather than R&D expenditures as a proxy for long-term productivity-enhancing investment. R&D
investments are a fraction of R&D expenditures that the firms are allowed to capitalize. There are
many reasons to look at investment rather than expenditures, the main one being that expenditures
are only available for a subset of big firms. Since the mechanisms we are looking at are more likely
to be observed for small firms, it is more pertinent to keep these firms in the sample and look at
R&D investment. This is reinforced by the fact that first, it makes the ratio of R&D investment over
4More than 50% of the firms in FiBEn have less than 20 employees. However, these firms are under-represented in
FiBEn since their sales rarely exceed the required amount.
5The median size is of around 30 employees per firm.
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total investment, which is central in our study, more homogenous, and second, R&D investment is
much more volatile than R&D expenditures, since the latter include in an important way researchers
wages that are more stable along the business cycle. Finally, another reason to use R&D investment
is that it allow us to run consistency checks using the firms’ balance sheet. Note that the accounting
behavior of firms should not been affected by changes in the fiscal environment: the R&D fiscal rules
has not been significantly altered during the studied period6. Using R&D investment, we check that
the sectoral R&D intensity is as expected (that is the lowest for agriculture and the highest for services
to businesses that include business software developments).
We also check whether our variable has a positive long-term effect on TFP growth. Table 3 shows
a clear positive correlation. An increase of the ratio R&D investment over value added is associated
with a significant rise of future TFP growth. The ratio R&D over total investment also has a positive
and significant impact.
[Table 3 about here]
3 Description of the payment incident variable
Although direct information on credit constraints is not available, we can derive an indirect measure
of credit constraints as follows. Since its introduction in 1992, all French banks have a legal obligation
to report within four business days to the “Syste`me Interbancaire de Te´le´compensation” anytime a
firm fails to pay its trade creditors. These non-payments of trade credits are called payment incidents
(henceforth PI). The Banque de France aggregates this information and makes it available to all
commercial banks through a weekly paper or an electronic report automatically sent to all bank
agencies. Also, since 1992, through a specific commercial network system, banks can immediately
access these reports covering the last 12 months; access is through internet since 2000. The complete
longitudinal dataset is available for research only at the Bank of France.
Banks are thus supposed to adapt their credit supply to this information, in particular they typi-
cally reduce future lending to firms that failed to repay their trade creditors. Our indicator for credit
constraints is a binary variable equal to 1 when the firm has experienced at least one payment inci-
dent during the previous year, and to zero otherwise. This variable is easy to interpret and weakly
correlated to our other key variables (see Table 14 in appendix). About 7% of firms experience each
year at least one payment incident, and about one third of firms in our sample has experienced at
least one payment incident over the overall period. All sectors are concerned by payment incidents,
especially manufacturing motor vehicles that includes small and medium subcontractors facing the
6The main reforms have been implemented during the fiscal years 1990 and in 2005.
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strong cyclicality of this industry. Conversely, real estate firms are less affected by the business cycle
and experience fewer payment incidents (table 2).
Our descriptive statistics (table 1) shows that credit constrained firms (here defined as the firms
that have experienced at least 1 payment incident during the period) display a lower ratio of R&D
investment over total investments, and a higher volatility (measured by the standard deviation) of
sales. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions: if credit constraints are in action, the
share of productivity-enhancing investment over total investment turns less countercyclical (or even
procyclical). Credit constraints thus prevent R&D from having a smoothing effect on productivity
and magnifies the business cycle - sales are more volatile. We confirm these stylized facts in the next
sections.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is important to underline that having a payment incident
does not mean that the firm is in financial distress or close to bankruptcy. Around a third of all firms
in our dataset experience at least once a payment incident (see Table 1), suggesting that payment
incidents hit a much larger set of firms than those about to disappear. As a robustness check, we
have restricted our sample to firms remaining in our sample over the entire period, or to firms which
are still in the sample four years after the payment incident, i.e. firms for which having a payment
incident cannot mean being close to bankruptcy. This left our results unchanged.
4 Payment Incidents as a generator of credit constraints
In this section we investigate the effect of experiencing a payment incident (PI) on future bank loans.
More precisely, we study the impact of having experienced at least one PI during the two previous
years (t− 1 and t− 2) both on the probability to contract a new bank loan, and on the amount of this
loan. We estimate the following specification:
BkLi,t = α1PIi,t−1 + α2PIi,t−2 + βjXi,t−1 + µt + ρi + i,t (5)
where BkLi,t ≥ 0 represents the amount of new bank loans contracted by firm i during year t, PIi,t−1
is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever firm i had a payment incident during year t − 1, and Xi,t−1
is a set of controls that includes various determinants of bank loans supply. In particular, we control
for firm size (number of employees) and its squared value, for the firm’s cash-flow, and for collateral
and the firm’s dependence upon bank finance (banking debt over total debt)7. All these variables are
7A more detailed description of the computation of these different variables is provided in the Appendix - Table 13.
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lagged.
We expect the supply of bank loans to be higher for firms with higher cash flow and collateral.
Size may have a non-linear effect - i.e. a lower positive effect on credit supply at higher levels. Finally,
we expect the estimated coefficients on the PI variable to be negative - banks are supposed to reduce
their credit supply to firms that failed to repay their trade creditors.
We also include a full set of year dummies (µt) to account for time specific effects, and estimate
the equation with firms’ fixed effects (ρi). Alternatively, we assess separately the impact of having
experienced a payment incident in the past, on both, the access to new bank loans (by using a Logit
estimation) and on the amount of this loan (by using a left-censored, Tobit estimation). Finally, we
replace the dependent variable “new bank loans” by the share of long term loans over total loans.
The idea here is that credit constrained firms have relatively more short term loans as banks are more
reluctant to give them long terms ones. We thus expect the coefficient on PI to be negative in this
latter estimation.
Our specification only takes into account supply factors in explaining firms’ new bank loans’.
However, our regressors may be correlated with factors which affect firms’ demand for new loans.
In particular, the demand for credit should be positively correlated with firms’ investment demand,
which itself should be positively correlated with current sales. To partly capture this demand effect,
we introduce lagged sales variation, and the lag of the share of R&D investment over value added as
additional controls.
[Table 4 about here]
Results are shown in Table 4. The estimated coefficients on control variables have the expected sign:
a larger cash flow, size and collateral are all positively correlated with banks credit supply (columns (a)
to (d)). Results are qualitatively unchanged when controlling for past sales variations (columns (i) and
(j)). Having experienced a payment incident during the previous year has a negative and significant
impact, both on the probability to contract a new loan (logit estimation, column (l)) and on the size
of the loan (within estimations). In the last two columns we decompose the marginal effects computed
from a left-censored tobit estimation of the previous specification in two subcomponents: namely, the
marginal effect on the probability to contract a new loan and the effect on the size of the loan. Having
experienced a payment incident has more negative impact both on the size of the loan than on the
probability to contract a new loan. We also find that having experienced a payment incident two years
before does not have any impact on credit supply8. One potential explanation for this latter finding
8We also tried to determine whether the number of payment incidents or the extent of the unpaid trade credits play
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is that the electronic service provided by the Bank of France gives commercial banks access to only
the past year PI. Note that the introduction of the convivial internet access in 2000 does not seem to
have modified the correlation between PI and credit supply between before and after 2000 (columns
(f) and (g)). Finally, our results exhibit a negative correlation between PI and the share of long-term
debt in total debt - an especially important fact since we will study in the next part the effect of credit
constraints on the share of long-run investment.
These findings are consistent with the idea of a significant impact of payment incidents on credit
supply. We shall build on these results in our main analysis, in which we use the binary variable
equal to 1 whenever the firm has experienced at least one PI in year t− 1, as our indicator for credit
constraint in year t.
As we explain in more details in the next section, this measure of credit constraint is not immune
from potential endogeneity problems. In particular, both the composition of investment and the fact
of having experienced a payment incident, may result from the existence of omitted variables. For
example the firm may decide that a given activity is no longer worth pursuing, and as a result reduce
both, its R&D investment and also its diligence vis-a-vis trade creditors in that activity. To deal with
the endogeneity problem and further confirm the relevance of payment incidents as a generator of
credit constraints, we use the Rajan and Zingales (1998)’s industry-level measure of financial external
dependence9. More precisely, we shall run our main estimations on two different sub-samples, respec-
tively containing highly and lowly dependent sectors. We explain our methodology in more details in
the next section.
IV Credit constraints and the cyclicality of R&D investment
In this section we use our PI measure of credit constraints to test our main theoretical predictions.
In particular we will show that: (1) the R&D / investment ratio is less countercyclical for firms
facing tighter credit constraints; (2) this procyclicality effect tends to be asymmetric: it operates
mainly during low sales states. The next section will discuss robustness checks and implications of
our results, in particular for the effect of volatility on the level of R&D and on average productivity
growth in credit-constrained firms.
a role; we find that payment incidents have nearly the same effects on R&D share over the business cycle no matter the
number or magnitude of incidents.
9See Rajan and Zingales (1998). The RZ indicator measures the extent to which the corresponding sector in the US
is more or less dependent upon external finance.
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1 Proposition 1: Cyclicality of the R&D share and credit constraints
1.1 Specification
We test our first proposition by estimating the following specification:
RDi,t
Ii,t + RDi,t
= α0 + β1∆si,t + β2∆si,t−1 + β3∆sit−2 + θPIi,t−1+
γ1∆si,t ∗ PIi,t−1 + γ2∆si,t−1 ∗ PIi,t−1 + γ3∆si,t−2 ∗ PIi,t−1 + µt + νi + εit (6)
where RDit represents R&D investment (used as a proxy for long-term, productivity enhancing in-
vestment), Ii,t +RDi,t total investment (physical plus R&D investment), PIi,t−1 the payment incident
dummy (used as an indicator for credit constraints), and ∆sit the variation in sales
10 of firm i during
year t. We control for time fixed effects µt
11, and for firms fixed effects.
We thus analyze the interacted impact of sales cycles and credit constraints on the composition
of investment. Based on our theoretical analysis, we expect the share of R&D investment to be
countercyclical in the absence of credit constraints; we thus expect β1 < 0 and
∑
βi < 0. However,
credit constraints are supposed to reverse the cyclicality of investment composition: they should lead
to a less countercyclical long-run investment (γ1 > 0,
∑
γi > 0). Finally, by themselves credit
constraints have an uncertain effect on investment composition. A firm most probably reduces its
short- and long-run investment when it is credit constrained; but we do not know which investment
will be more affected. Thus, we do not expect a particular sign or significance on θ.
As mentioned before, we estimate the equation with firm fixed effects. The results are almost
unchanged when using a Random effects / GLS methodology with sector and size dummies.12 More
importantly, taking into account the important share of zero-values in our R&D variable by estimating
the previous specification using a left-censored Tobit does not change the results qualitatively either.
However, the estimated coefficients may be biased since current sales and investment may be co-
determined. A traditional solution to this problem is to use an instrumental variable (IV) methodology,
where the instruments are an appropriated set of lagged values of the variables. This argues in favor
of using the GMM method. Using GMM estimations does not alter the results, both qualitatively and
quantitatively13, but instruments are rejected by the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. This
10Defined as: Log(Salest) − Log(Salest−1).
11We also included year×sector dummies to account for sectoral shocks such as privatization. Results were unaffected.
12The inclusion of these controls in a within estimation does not add much since sectors and size specific effects are
already captured by the firms’ fixed effects.
13Results available upon request.
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is in line with a number of papers including Mulkay et al. (2001), which emphasize the weakness of
GMM instruments in this kind of firm-level estimations. To account for this potential simultaneity
bias, we instead perform two-stage estimations, using two different instrumental variables for current
sales variations. We make use of destination-specific information on firms’ export quantities (a detailed
description of this data is given in appendix) to construct two different indicators, respectively reflect-
ing the level of exchange rate and foreign demand faced by exporters. More precisely, we construct
the following indicators:
RERit =
( N∑
j=1
rerjt × αijt
)
×
Xi,t−1
Si,t−1
GDPit =
( N∑
j=1
gdpjt × αijt
)
×
Xi,t−1
Si,t−1
(7)
where rerjt is the real bilateral exchange rate between France and country j, gdpjt is the GDP of
country j, αijt is the share of firm i’s total export to country j, Xit and Sit are firm i’s total exports
and total sales during year t. For each indicator, the first term represents the average real exchange
rate and the average foreign demand faced by a firm i, weighted by the share of each destination
in firm i’s total exports. The second term represents the firm i’s foreign orientation in t − 1. Both
a depreciation (increase in rer) and an increase in foreign demand (increase in gdp) have a positive
impact on exports, and then affect positively current sales, especially when the firm is outward oriented.
These instruments are firm-year specific, but exchange rate and GDP are determined at the macro
level, so that they are fully exogenous to firm-level behavior - in particular to physical investment and
R&D patterns. We use the current values and two lags of these two indicators as instruments. We
check their validity using the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test provides a diagnosis on endogeneity.
1.2 Results
Columns (a), (b) and (c) in Table 5 report the within estimations of the potential impact of sales
changes on the composition of investment. These estimations include current sales shocks and up to
two-period lagged shocks.
These first results show a countercyclicality of the share of R&D in the investment spending. A 10
percent change in current sales induces a modification in the opposite direction of the share of R&D
of 0,2 percentage point the same year, and also the next year, and still half of this effect two years
after. But the correlation vanishes for older shocks (regressions not reported). The magnitude of the
current impact of this 10 percent change in current sales is quite important: about 4 % of the R&D
average share.
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[Table 5 about here]
Introducing PI as an additional explanatory variable does not also alter the countercyclicality of
the share of R&D in the investment spending. On its own, PI shows no significant impact on the R&D
share in the within estimation, suggesting that R&D investment and physical investment tend to be
affected in the same way by the occurrence of payment incidents.
Now, when we interact PI with our sales shock variables, we obtain the expected results: consistent
with theoretical predictions, the share of R&D investment turns less countercyclical in presence of
credit constraints (Table 5, columns (d), (e) and (f)).
Columns (g), (h) and (i) present the results of the two-stage estimations. The sample is reduced
because of data availability: we only have destination-specific export information from 1996 to 2004
(due to the use of lagged values of instrumental variables, the time period used in the estimation is then
1998-2004). Running the within estimations on this subsample does not modify the results. Endo-
geneity cannot be rejected by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, but the Sargan test supports the choice
of our instruments. The results are slightly different in those specifications: the payment incident
variable turns out to be negative and significant, while the variation in sales becomes insignificant.
This suggest that the negative relationship between sales’ variation and the share of R&D investment
found previously was mainly due to the simultaneity between sales and investment. However, our main
results are strengthened by the use of instrumental variables: the interaction terms between sales and
payment incident are highly significant in t and t − 1, suggesting that the share of R&D investment
turns procyclical in presence of credit constraints.
1.3 Robustness
As already mentioned in the previous section, another source of endogeneity lies in the possibility
that both, a firm’s investment structure and whether it is subject to a payment incident, may hinge
on some omitted variable. Note that the omitted variables have to be firm-year specific (if not, it is
captured by year or firm fixed effects), and to co-determine PI in year t − 1 and the R&D share of
investment in year t, without affecting the R&D share at t− 1 in the same way as it affects the R&D
share at t (since the inclusion of a lagged term of the dependant variable does not modify the results).
These variables cannot be sector-year specific since the inclusion of sector-year dummies leaves the
results unchanged.
To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, we use the sectoral financial dependence indicator
of Rajan and Zingales (1998). More precisely, we run the last set of estimations on two different sub-
samples, respectively consisting of sectors with analogs in the US that are more (above median) and
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less (below median) financially dependent. Our idea is here twofold. First, there is a priori no reason
for this endogeneity bias to be differently distributed across sectors with different levels of external
dependence, that is, for the omitted variable to affect PI(t-1) and the structure of investment in year
t (with the above restrictions) only in sectors that are more dependent upon external finance. Second,
the previous results should be exacerbated in more financially dependent sectors. Hence, getting more
significant results on the financially dependent sub-sample would suggest both that the endogeneity
bias is weak and that payment incident indeed generates firm-level credit constraints. Importantly, the
probability of experiencing a payment incident is not correlated with the sectoral degree of financial
external dependence: this probability is equal to 7% in both subsamples.
We repeat this robustness check by using the Braun (2003) index of asset tangibility instead of the
measure of external dependence. Firms operating in industries characterized by a higher level of asset
tangibility14 are expected to face lower credit constraints, everything else being equal. The interaction
between sales and payment incident is thus expected to be more significant for firms operating in
industries characterized by a lower level of asset tangibility.
[Table 6 about here]
Results provided in table 6 show that the share of R&D investment becomes less countercyclical in
presence of credit constraint only for firms in sectors that are more dependent upon external finance
(column (b)). Estimated coefficients are insignificant for firms the other sub-samples (column (a)).
This in turn suggests a causal effect of credit constraints on the procyclicality of R&D investments.
The two stage estimations confirms those results: R&D turns procyclical in presence of payment
incidents only in more financially dependent sectors (column (c) and (d)).
Note that that without credit constraints, the cyclicality of R&D share is not different in the two
subsamples (i.e. the coefficient on sales variations statistically different in columns (a) and (b), or (c)
and (d)). This suggests that financially dependent sectors are not characterized by a lower level of
creative destruction than sectors which do not rely on external finance. This support the validity of
our subsample analysis.
These results are confirmed when we divide our sample according to the sectoral degree of asset
tangibility (columns (e) to (h)). The interaction between sales and payment incident is strongly
significant only in sectors with low asset tangibility (columns (e) and (g)).
14Tangible assets include net property, plant and equipment. For more information on the computations of asset
tangibility and external dependence indexes, see Braun (2003) and Rajan and Zingales (1998)
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2 Proposition 2: Asymmetry between positive and negative shocks
2.1 Specification
The interactions terms in the previous tables need to be interpreted with caution: their positive signs
can either mean that credit constraints prevent firms from increasing their R&D share in downturns,
or that firms increase more this share during upturns periods when they are financially constrained.
In this section, we disentangle the up- and downturns effects and show that the effect of credit
constraints on the R&D share depends upon the firm’s position within its business cycle. Intuitively,
one expects this effect to be stronger during downturns as credit constraints are more likely to be
binding in that case. More specifically, we decompose the sales variation variable in two components:
downturns (first quartile of sales variations) and upturns (last quartile). We implicitly assume that
a large negative shock leads to the equivalent of our a whereas a large positive shock leads to the
equivalent of our a.
We expect credit constraints to prevent firms from increasing their R&D share mainly during
downturns, thus it is the interaction terms between this variable and payments incidents that should
be most positive and significant. The specification becomes:
RDi,t
Ii,t + RDi,t
= α0 +
2∑
j=0
(
αj∆s
H
i,t−j + γj∆s
L
i,t−j
)
+ α4PIi,t−1+
2∑
j=0
(
θj∆s
H
i,t−j ∗ PIi,t−1 + λj∆s
L
i,t−j ∗ PIi,t−1
)
+ µt + νi + εit (8)
where ∆sHi,t equals sales variations if the firm is above its mean value for this variable, and to 0
otherwise; ∆sLi,t equals sales variations if the firm is below its mean, 0 otherwise. We also use another
decomposition of sales shocks, by sector: in this case, ∆sHi,t equals sales variations if the firm is above
the third quartile (computed by sector) of this variable and zero otherwise; similarly ∆sLi,t equals sales
variations if the firm below the first quartile, and zero otherwise15.
Our contention is that credit constraints should play a more important role during recessions
(λj > 0, λj > θj ).
15We also tried with alternative decompositions, based on quartiles computed by year, of sector-year. The results were
qualitatively unchanged.
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2.2 Results
[Table 7 about here]
Results are provided in table 7. In particular we see that the interaction term between sales
variation and PI is significant only for lower shocks. Furthermore, the share of R&D investment turns
procyclical16 for the lower shocks in case of a PI while it is countercyclical when no PI occurs. A 10
percent drop in current sales in a firm experiencing a PI in the previous year, induces a significant
reduction of the share of R&D in total investment of about 0.25 point (5%), but for a firm that has not
experienced PI this share falls down to 3%. Finally, whether firms are subject to PI or not, the share
of R&D in total investment becomes countercyclical for large positive sales shocks. This is consistent
with the view that firms escape their credit constraints thanks to upward positions in their business
cycle. Note also that the uninteracted effect of PI is not affected by the decomposition. Finally, the use
of IV methodology confirms that the interacted term between payment incidents and sales variations
is only significant for low sales shocks (columns (e), (f), (k) and (l)).
3 Shock and cyclical position of the firm
One objection to the previous estimation relates to the implicit assumption that the size of shocks
determines the position of the firm within its business cycle. However, even if firms are in the low
(resp. high) part of their business cycle they may experience large negative (resp. positive) shocks.
To handle this caveat, we divide our sample according to the initial position of firms. We assume
that a firm is already lying on the upward (resp. downward) part of its cycle if the real sales per
employee are above (resp. below) its median.
• When a firm lies initially in the upward part of its cycle at time t − 1, we expect: (i) that
the effect of a high sales shock alone should be either negative (the share of R&D investment
becomes more countercyclical as the firm moves further up) or insignificant (as the share of R&D
investment is low from the start); (ii) that the effect of a payment incident on the R&D share is
insignificant as the credit constraint is essentially not binding; (iii) that a low sales shock should
significantly increase the share of R&D; (iv) finally, that the interaction effect between PI and a
(small) sales shock should not be significant.
16This procyclicality is confirmed by a Wald test, showing that the coefficient on ∆st is significantly lower than the
coefficient on ∆st ∗ PI(t − 1).
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• When a firm lies initially in the downward part of its cycle at t− 1, the interaction between PI
and a positive sales shock should become positive and significant.
[Table 8 about here]
Results in Table 8 are consistent with these predictions and our previous estimations. Whatever
the initial position of the firm, the correlation between a sales shock and the R&D share is, as expected,
non positive for firms without PI and non negative for firms affected by a PI. In addition, if the initial
position of the firm is high, the coefficients are significantly different from zero when the sales shock is
adverse. Alternatively, if the initial position of the firm is low, the coefficients are significantly different
from zero when the sales shock is positive.
V Discussion
In this section we discuss some extensions and implications of our analysis. First, we argue that our
main results carry over when we move from R&D share of investment to R&D levels: in other words,
the higher procyclicality of the R&D share in a more credit-constrained firm, is not primarily driven
by a variation in its physical investment. Second, we weight our estimations by the size of the firm
to check that our micro results hold at a macro level. Finally, move from R&D share to firm level
productivity growth and analyze how this latter variable responds to sales volatility interacted with
firm-level credit constraints.
1 From R&D share to R&D level
As total investments are not constant over the firm’s business cycle, our previous results do not provide
direct information on how the average level of R&D investment is affected by credit constraints. For
example, a procyclical R&D share would be consistent with the level of R&D either increasing or
decreasing, if it turned out that the amount of physical invesment increases sufficiently during slumps.
The easyest way to tackle this issue would have been to use the accumulation rate of R&D as the
left hand side variable in our regressions. However, the computation of R&D capital stock is subject
to many technical problems which prevent the results from being easily interpreted. Another way to
answer the question is then to look at the accumulation rate of physical investment, and derive from
its variations and from our results on the share of R&D investment the impact of credit constraints on
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the level of R&D. We then chose to present both the results on the R&D and physical investment levels.
We use the following specification:
Invi,t
Ki,t−1
= α0+η1
Invi,t−1
Ki,t−2
+ξ1∆si,t+ξ2∆si,t−1+α1PIi,t−1+β1∆si,t∗PIi,t−1+β2∆si,t−1∗PIi,t−1+µt+νi+εit
(9)
where Invi,t is either physical investment or R&D investment, Ki,t denotes either the stock of capital
or the stock of R&D, and ∆si,t is the variation in sales of firm i during year t. The dependent variable
is the accumulation rate of either physical capital or R&D. We estimate this equation with firms and
year fixed effects17.
We expect both physical investment and R&D investment to be procyclical (ξ1, ξ2 > 0) and nega-
tively affected by credit constraints (α1 < 0). The signs of β1 and β2 provide direct information on the
cyclical variation of both physical investment and R&D in response to credit constraints. The latter
are supposed to influence the cyclicality of R&D investment without affecting the cyclical behavior
of short-run investment. We thus expect β1 and β2 to be significantly positive when estimating the
above equation using R&D investment as a dependent variable, while those coefficients are expected
to be insignificant on physical investment.
[Table 9 about here]
Our results are in line with these predictions. Table 9 shows that both R&D and physical in-
vestment are procyclical. Consistently with theory, R&D is less procyclical. Payment incident affects
negatively both R&D and physical investment. More importantly, physical investments are uniformly
affected by credit constraint over the business cycle (column (f)), whereas R&D level turns more
procyclical when the firm has experienced a payment incident (column (c)). This, together with our
previous findings, makes it clear that: (a) the average level of R&D investment decreases with sales
volatility when the firm is more credit constrained; (b) this level decreases more in downturns for more
credit-constrained firms.
17We also have estimated the effect of PI and its interaction with ∆st using structural investment equations based on
Mulkay et al. (2001). The results, available upon request, were qualitatively unchanged.
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2 From micro to macro effects of credit constraints
If our results are significant at the individual level, one may argue that innovative behavior over the
cycle should not be affected by credit constraints at the macro level. Indeed, most of R&D investment
is concentrated on a few large firms, which are less likely to be hit by credit constraints. Moreover,
as our previous estimates treat each firm as one observation, regardless of their size, our results may
only suggest that, although significant at the individual level, the effect we find leaves overall R&D
roughly unaffected.
In this section, we check the robustness of our results at the macroeconomic level. More precisely,
we weight our estimations by the size of the firm (either value added or number of employees). In such
estimation, a firm employing ten workers will be accounted ten times. Results are reported in table
10.
[Table 10 about here]
As exposed in Table 10, R&D is still significantly more procyclical in credit constrained firms than
in firms which did not experienced a payment incident in t− 1. Even when weighting the estimations
by firms size, the interaction terms between PI and variation in sales remain significant - even if lower
in value in columns (a) and (b). Only the payment incidents variable becomes positive and significant
(only at ten percents in estimation (d)), suggesting that large firms, when facing such an incident,
decrease more their short-run physical investment than their long-run, R&D investment than small
firms.
Thus, our main results should be significant even at the macro level. Moreover, another important
effect, dynamic, cannot be captured by the present estimations, but should be added to the overall
effect of credit constraints and business cycles on innovation and growth at the macro level: by
preventing small firms to make their innovation in downturns, credit constraints may also prevent those
firms from growing. This mechanism, which is not taken into account in these weighted estimations,
may also affect negatively overall growth, as well as overall R&D investment.
3 From R&D to productivity growth
In this subsection we investigate the interacted effect of PI and sales shocks on firm average productivity
growth. The prediction is that the interacted effect should be negative, with growth in more credit
constrained firms responding more positively to a positive sales shock.
[Table 11 about here]
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Results in Table 11 are in line with these predictions. First, the effect of adverse shocks on average
productivity growth for credit constrained firms is negative: the variable shock in this table is a
dummy equal to 1 when the firm has experienced both, an adverse shock and a payment incident in
year t − 1. The table shows an estimated coefficient of average productivity growth on this variable
which is negative and significant. When we control for sectoral R&D intensity (captured by the mean
of the share of R&D investment over total investment, computed by sector), this coefficient is no
longer significant, whereas the interaction term remains negative and significant. This suggests that
the negative effect of adverse shocks on productivity growth in credit constrained firms is related to
the impact of those shocks on long-term R&D investment.
[Table 12 about here]
Additional evidence on the role of credit constraints in the relationship between business cycles and
productivity growth is presented in table 12, which presents cross-section estimations of the correlation
between the volatility of growth and average TFP growth over the period 1994-2004. All estimations
include controls for firm size and sector dummies. The impact of growth volatility alone is found to
be insignificant (column (a)), but turns negative in more financially dependent industries (column
(b)). In the last four columns we present separate estimations for high (above median) and low
(below median) R&D intensity sectors. Consistent with our theoretical model, the negative impact of
volatility on growth in more financially dependent sectors appears only in R&D intensive industries,
suggesting that credit constraints magnify the negative impact of volatility on growth at least partly
through their effects on R&D investment. Finally, those conclusions hold at the macro level too: the
consideration of estimations weighted by firms’ size does not alter the results of tables 11 and 12.18
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the relationship between credit constraints and firms’ R&D behavior over the
business cycle using a French firm-level panel data set over the period 1993-2004. We show that: (i)
the share of R&D investment over total investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but
it becomes less countercyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints; (ii) the result is magnified for
firms in financial dependent sectors, and in sectors characterized by a low degree of asset tangibility;
(iii) in more credit constrained firms, R&D investment share plummets during recessions but does not
increase proportionally during upturns; (iv) average R&D investment and productivity growth are
more negatively correlated with sales volatility in more credit constrained firms.
18Results available upon request.
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An important next step in this research program will be to study the effect of macro-policy - both
monetary and budgetary policies - on firms’ R&D behavior over the business cycle. In particular, our
regression results in Tables 6, 11 and 12 suggest that more countercyclical macroeconomic policies
(e.g with higher fiscal deficits or lower interest rates in downturns) should enhance R&D investments
and productivity growth in firms that are more credit constrained and more dependent upon exter-
nal finance. However, a systematic investigation of the effects of macroeconomic policies on firms’
investment behavior is left for future research.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, whole sample
Variable No Obs. No. Firms Mean S.D Q1 Median Q3
Whole Sample
No Employees 73,237 12,966 94.70 288.03 16 32 68
Sales (1) 73,237 12,966 21141 1.9e+05 2098 4417 11126
Variation in Sales 73,237 12,966 0.04 0.19 -0.05 0.04 0.13
Payment Incidents (PI) 73,237 12,966 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
R&D Share (2) 73,237 12,966 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Credit Constrained Firms (4)
No Employees 26,864 4,646 110.86 331.63 17.00 34.00 72.00
Sales (1) 26,864 4,646 24512 1.9e+05 1919 4113 10549
Variation in Sales 26,864 4,646 0.04 0.19 -0.05 0.04 0.13
Payment Incidents 26,864 4,646 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
R&D Share (4) 26,864 4,646 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non Credit Constrained Firms (5)
No employees 46,373 8,320 85.33 258.98 16.00 31.00 66.00
Sales (1) 46,373 8,320 19189 1.8e+05 2210 4589 11454
Variation in Sales 46,373 8,320 0.05 0.19 -0.04 0.04 0.13
R&D Share (4) 46,373 8,320 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Payment incident
No employees 51,656 11,392 98.30 292.25 17.00 34.00 72.00
New Bank Loans / VA 54,253 11,392 0.03 1.37 0.00 0.00 0.01
Long Term / Total Loans 54,572 11,367 0.39 0.38 0.00 0.27 0.77
Collateral (1) 51,656 11,392 15784 1.8e+05 688 1716 4939
Bank Debt / Total Financing 51,651 11,390 0.22 0.20 0.05 0.17 0.33
Note: (1) : Thousands of euros; (2) R&D share : R&D investment / (Physical Investment + R&D Investment); (3)
Capital Stock Growth Rate : It/Kt−1; (4): At least 1 payment incident during the period; (5) no payment incident during
the period; Positive R&D investment rate for 24% of the total number of observations. Source: Authors’ computations
from Fiben / Centrale des Bilans, Banque de France.
25
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, by sector
Sector N (1) Share (2) No.Empl. No.Empl. R&D/I PI(3) CC firms
(4)
(median) (mean) (mean)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 138 1,06% 20 46 0,02 0,09 0,30
Manuf. of food products, bev., tobacco 642 4,95% 36 102 0,03 0,07 0,33
Manuf. of consumers goods 1045 8,06% 34 100 0,07 0,08 0,35
Manuf. of motor vehicles 204 1,57% 56 212 0,08 0,08 0,41
Manuf. of capital goods 2111 16,28% 32 84 0,11 0,08 0,36
Manuf. of intermediate goods 2503 19,30% 38 92 0,04 0,07 0,35
Energy 67 0,52% 48 374 0,04 0,04 0,19
Construction 618 4,77% 28 56 0,03 0,08 0,37
Trade 2724 20,01% 17 46 0,04 0,07 0,31
Transports 419 3,23% 41 166 0,02 0,05 0,26
Real estate activities 140 1,08% 14 40 0,03 0,03 0,16
Services to businesses 2104 16,23% 21 80 0,12 0,04 0,18
Personal and domestic services 251 1,94% 25 182 0,03 0,07 0,29
Total 12966 100 32 94,70 0,05 0,07 0,35
(1) Number of firms (2) Share of the total number of firms (3) Share of observations with a PI (4) Share of credit constrained firms, i.e. share of firms with at least one
time one payment incident during the period. Source: Authors’ computations from Fiben, Banque de France.
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Table 3: Effect of R&D on TFP Growth
Depvar: Average TFP Growth (t+2 to t+4)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Initial TFP -0.023a -0.024a
(0.001) (0.001)
R&D investment/VA 0.163a 0.074a
(0.018) (0.025)
R&D Invest./ Total Invest. 0.044a 0.012c
(0.004) (0.006)
Obs. 34596 36364 33627 35299
Adj. R2 0.033 0.025 0.035 0.025
Estimation OLS Within OLS Within
Note: Panel, within estimation. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All
estimations include year dummies. Intercept not reported.
27
Table 4: Payment Incidents as a generator of Credit Constraints
WITHIN WITHIN LOGIT TOBIT
Dep. var. : New bank loans Long term loans/ New bank loans
Total loans P (X > 0) P (X > 0) E(X|X > 0)
(Marginal Effects)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Before
2000
After
2000
PI(t-1) -0.264a -0.243a -0.239a -0.238a -0.227a -0.229b -0.256a -0.229a -0.228a -0.021a -0.020a -0.042a -0.043a -0.173a
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.110) (0.053) (0.043) (0.043) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028)
PI(t-2) -0.064 -0.059 -0.068c -0.057 -0.185c -0.042 -0.062 -0.062 -0.015a -0.003 -0.002 -0.008
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.112) (0.051) (0.045) (0.045) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.030)
Cash-flow(t-1) 0.575a 0.514a 0.424a 0.430a 0.492a 0.270a 0.391a 0.396a 0.070a 0.321a 0.309a 1.244a
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.102) (0.184) (0.090) (0.098) (0.098) (0.006) (0.020) (0.017) (0.071)
Size(t-1) 0.292a 0.158a 0.094 0.006 -0.125 0.080 0.025 0.031 -0.011c 0.120a 0.107a 0.434a
(0.107) (0.107) (0.111) (0.101) (0.358) (0.168) (0.137) (0.137) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.029)
Size2(t-1) -0.031c -0.032c -0.023b -0.014 0.013 -0.022 -0.017 -0.017 0.000 -0.017a -0.014a -0.059a
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.051) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Collateral(t-1) 0.288a 0.327a 0.324a 0.315a 0.346a 0.340a 0.333a 0.010a 0.012a 0.017a 0.068a
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.076) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Bank dep.(t-1) -1.355a -1.378a -3.099a -1.568a -1.340a -1.339a 0.268a 0.260a 0.353a 1.421a
(0.138) (0.127) (0.378) (0.181) (0.150) (0.150) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.059)
∆Sales(t-1) 0.053c 0.139a 0.142a 0.001
(0.028) (0.040) (0.041) (0.002)
∆Sales(t-2) 0.109a 0.155a 0.157a 0.004b
(0.026) (0.035) (0.035) (0.002)
R&D/V A(t-1) 0.436c 0.429b
(0.406) (0.406)
∆Sales(t) 0.024a
(0.037)
Obs. 54266 51140 51140 50667 47578 14473 36194 45515 45515 54572 54572 50667 50667 50667
No. Firms 11911 11375 11375 11310 10664 8167 10124 10459 10459 11367 11367 11310 11310 11310
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
Log Likelihood -29333.02 -63257.82 -63257.82
Year / Sect. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses. All variables are computed from Fiben / Centrale des Bilans, Banque de France. PI : Payment Incident (0/1); Bank Dep.: (Banking Debt
/ Total Debt). Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. Intercept not reported. All variables are in logarithms. Marginal effects computed at means for logit and tobit estimations.
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Table 5: Credit constraints and the cyclical composition of investment (1)
Depvar: R&D investment / Total Investment R&D inv./Total Inv.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
∆Sales(t) -0.016a -0.018a -0.020a -0.018a -0.020a -0.022a -0.002 -0.036 -0.050
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
∆Sales(t-1) -0.014a -0.016a -0.015a -0.017a -0.007 -0.014
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.019)
∆Sales(t-2) -0.010a -0.011a -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
PI(t-1) 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.018a -0.021a -0.018a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
∆Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.029a 0.030a 0.030a 0.687a 0.655a 0.533a
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.220) (0.204) (0.195)
∆Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) 0.017 0.018 0.069a 0.061a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018)
∆Sales(t-2)*PI(t-1) 0.013 0.011
(0.010) (0.012)
No Obs. 73,237 30,052
No Groups 12,966 6,587
Estimation Within FE-2SLS
Sargan Stat. 7.192 6.462 10.525
P-value 0.707 0.775 0.396
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Stat. 11.824 11.25 7.388
P-value 0.003 0.004 0.025
Note: Panel, within estimations. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All
estimations include year dummies. Intercept not reported. Current value and two lags of RERit and GDPit used as
instruments in columns (g) to (i).
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Table 6: Main regressions with financial dependence, asset tangibility
Depvar: R&D investment / Total Investment R&D investment / Total Investment
Financial Dependence Asset Tangibility
Low High Low High Low High Low High
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
∆Sales(t) -0.021a -0.038a -0.027 -0.014 -0.038a -0.022a -0.050 -0.059
(0.005) (0.006) (0.107) (0.109) (0.006) (0.005) (0.102) (0.089)
∆Sales(t-1) -0.012b -0.032a -0.019 -0.013 -0.031a -0.006 -0.027 -0.019
(0.005) (0.006) (0.027) (0.037) (0.006) (0.005) (0.035) (0.023)
∆Sales(t-2) -0.013a -0.027a -0.007 -0.012 -0.026b -0.009b -0.021 -0.013
(0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.027) (0.005) (0.004) (0.024) (0.018)
PI(t-1) 0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.026b 0.003 0.003 -0.019b -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011)
∆Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.026 0.049b -0.013 0.561c 0.058b 0.036c 0.399c 0.236
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.306) (0.018) (0.018) (0.224) (0.238)
∆Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) -0.001 0.011 0.007 0.138b 0.024 -0.020 0.091a 0.020
(0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.055) (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.024)
∆Sales(t-2)*PI(t-1) 0.000 0.049b 0.014 0.025 0.044b -0.002 0.045b 0.022
(0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.029) (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.020)
No Observations 20,028 18,457 9,272 8,234 22,892 20,363 10,064 9,436
No Firms 3,403 3,221 2,345 2,485 3,957 3,423 2,853 2,511
Estimation Within FE-2SLS Within FE-2SLS
Sargan Stat. 13.285 10.250 17.663 11.693
P-value 0.208 0.419 0.061 0.306
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Stat. 0.085 3.331 2.360 0.709
P-value 0.958 0.189 0.3072 0.701
Note: Panel, within estimations. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All esti-
mations include year dummies. Intercept not reported. Rajan and Zingales (1998) data for sectoral financial dependence.
Braun (2003) data for sectoral asset tangibility. Current value and two lags of RERit and GDPit used as instruments
in columns (g) to (i).
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Table 7: Credit constraints and the cyclical composition of investment, asymmetry, Within estimations (1)
Depvar: R&D investment / Total Investment
Decomposition by firm (1) Decomposition by Sector (2)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
High ∆Sales(t) -0.020a -0.023a -0.021a -0.023a 0.046 -0.034 -0.017a -0.019a -0.018a -0.020a 0.046 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.123) (0.117) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.111) (0.111)
Low ∆Sales(t) -0.008 -0.011b -0.014b -0.016a 0.030 0.066 -0.010c -0.013b -0.016a -0.019a -0.052 -0.077
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.143) (0.149) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.132) (0.137)
High ∆Sales(t-1) -0.015a -0.017a -0.016 -0.013a -0.015a -0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.018)
Low ∆Sales(t-1) -0.012b -0.012b 0.016 -0.013b -0.013b -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022)
PI(t-1) 0.003 0.003 0.055b 0.043b 0.003 0.003 0.047b 0.040b
(0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.020) (0.002) (0.003) (0.021) (0.020)
High ∆Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.005 0.005 -0.294 -0.214 0.007 0.005 -0.085 -0.026
(0.016) (0.016) (0.268) (0.255) (0.015) (0.016) (0.249) (0.252)
Low ∆Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.054a 0.055a 0.733a 0.733a 0.056a 0.058a 0.834a 0.822a
(0.017) (0.017) (0.186) (0.204) (0.017) (0.017) (0.255) (0.267)
High ∆Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) 0.024 0.053 0.024 0.053
(0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.033)
Low ∆Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) 0.005 -0.033 0.001 0.023
(0.021) (0.046) (0.021) (0.054)
No Obs. 73,237 30,052 73,237 30,052
No Firms 12,966 6,587 12,966 6,587
Estimation WITHIN FE-2SLS WITHIN FE-2SLS
Sargan Stat. 5.459 5.353 5.599 5.380
P-value 0.707 0.719 0.692 0.716
Durbin-Wu-Haus. Stat. 12.194 10.836 12.391 11.172
P-value 0.0160 0.028 0.015 0.024
Note: (1) Decomposition by firm: above (high) and below (low) firm’s mean sales’ variation; (2) Decomposition by sector: firm above the third quartile of its sector’s sales
variation (high) or below the first quartile (low). Panel, within estimations. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All estimations
include year dummies. Intercept not reported. Current value and two lags of RERit and GDPit used as instruments in columns (g) to (i).
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Table 8: Asymmetry, with initial state
Dep. var. R&D/(I + R&D)
Initial State: High Low
Est. (a) (b)
High ∆Sales(t) -0.002 -0.025a
(0.006) (0.005)
Low ∆Sales(t) -0.018a -0.027a
(0.006) (0.009)
PI(t-1) 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
High ∆Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.025 0.007
(0.024) (0.018)
Low ∆Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.042b 0.060b
(0.020) (0.025)
No. Obs. 34,360 38,877
No. Firms 11,563 12,597
Estimation Within
Note: High resp. low) state: sales per employee above (resp. below) firms’ median. Standard errors into parentheses.
Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All estimations include year dummies. Intercept not reported. All variables are in
logarithms.
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Table 9: Levels of R&D and Physical Investment
Dep. var. Accumulation rate: Invt
Kt−1
R&D Physical Investment
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Inv(t− 1)/K(t− 2) -0.020a -0.009b -0.009b 0.058a 0.058a 0.058a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
∆Sales(t) 0.015a 0.014a 0.010b 0.127a 0.127a 0.126a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
∆Sales(t-1) 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.095a 0.095a 0.095a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
PI(t-1) -0.004b -0.005a -0.013a -0.012a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
∆Sales(t) * PI(t-1) 0.047a 0.007
(0.016) (0.021)
∆Sales(t-1) * PI(t-1) 0.055a -0.008
(0.017) (0.023)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.08
No Obs. 61,627 61,627 61,627 72,609 72,609 72,609
No Firms 11,520 11,520 11,520 12,877 12,877 12,877
Estimation Within Within
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All estimations include year and
sector dummies. Intercept not reported.
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Table 10: Credit constraints and the cyclicality of R&D investment, Weighted estimations
Depvar: R&D investment / Total Investment
(a) (b) (c) (d)
∆Sales(t) -0.016a -0.018a -0.021a -0.022a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
∆Sales(t-1) -0.013a -0.014a -0.015a -0.017a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
∆Sales(t-2) -0.012a -0.011a
(0.000) (0.001)
PI(t-1) 0.003a 0.002a 0.002a 0.001c
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
∆Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.002a 0.003a 0.028a 0.028a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
∆Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) 0.003a 0.005a 0.016a 0.017a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
∆Sales(t-2)*PI(t-1) 0.020a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.003)
No Obs. 73,237
No Groups 12,966
Estimation Within
Weighted by No. Workers Value Added
Note: Panel, weighted least squares. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All
estimations include year dummies. Intercept not reported.
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Table 11: Productivity, R&D and Credit Constraints
Dep. var.: MEAN TFP Growth (t+2) to (t+5)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Initial TFP -0.031a -0.031a
(0.001) (0.001)
Shock -0.063a -0.017 -0.037c 0.001
(0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.027)
Sect. R&D Intensity 1.104a 1.095a
(0.041) (0.042)
Shock*Sect R&D Intensity -3.936a -3.284b
(1.487) (1.575)
No obs. 33,973 33,973 33,973 33,973
R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
Est. OLS Fixed Effects / Within
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All estimations include year
dummies. Shock equals 1 if the firm is credit constraint and has a negative shock in t, 0 otherwise. R&D intensity :
industry mean of R&D Investment / Total Investment.
Table 12: Volatility, Growth and Credit Constraints
Dep. Var TFP Growth TFP Growth TFP Growth
High R&D intensity Low R&D intensity
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Initial TFP -0.021a -0.020a -0.021a -0.020a -0.022a -0.022a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Growth Volatility 0.003 -0.037 -0.012 -0.074c 0.012 -0.015
(0.022) (0.028) (0.035) (0.039) (0.026) (0.038)
Growth volatility*Fin. Dep -0.033c -0.066c -0.018
(0.018) (0.037) (0.021)
No. Observations 4459 4459 2249 2249 2310 2310
R2 0.141 0.146 0.152 0.164 0.089 0.090
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses. Significance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. OLS estimations, over the period
1994-2004; each estimation includes sector and size dummies. Rajan and Zingales (1998) data for sectoral financial
dependence. R&D intensity : industry mean of R&D Investment / Total Investment. Large (resp. low) R&D intensity:
above (resp. below) median of R&D intensity.
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Table 13: Variables Description
Variable Description Source
New bank loans Total amount of new bank loans Centrale des Bilans, Banque de France (BdF)
Payment Incident 1 when the firm experienced at least Observatoire des entreprises, BdF
one payment incident, 0 otherwise
∆Sales Log(sales)-Log(sales(t-1)) Fiben, BdF
Size Number of Employees Fiben, BdF
Collateral Sum of fixed and tangible assets Fiben, BdF
Banking Debt Banking debt / Fiben, BdF
(Own Financing + Market Financing + Financial Debt)
R&D Share R&D Investment / (Physical + R&D Investment) Fiben, BdF
Exchange Rate Real Bilateral Exchange Rate IMF / Penn World Tables
GDP GDP IMF
Exports Destination-specific export values Balance of Payments, BdF
Table 14: Correlations
Variable Var. Sales PI Inv. Rate (1) R&D Inv. Rate (2) R&D Share (3)
Variation in Sales 1.0000
Payment Incidents -0.0416 1.0000
Investment Rate (1) 0.349 -0.0068 1.0000
R&D Investment Rate (2) -0.006 0.0331 0.2137 1.0000
R&D Share (3) -0.0041 0.0363 0.0611 0.7697 1.0000
Note: (1) Capital Stock Growth Rate : It/Kt−1 ; (2): R&D Investment / Value Added; (3) R&D share : R&D investment
/ (Physical Investment + R&D Investment); ; Source: Authors’ computations from Fiben / Centrale des Bilans, Banque
de France.
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